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Abstract
We propose to estimate strategic interaction e⁄ects between general practitioners (GPs) and di⁄er-
ent specialist types to evaluate the viability threat for specialists associated to the introduction of a
mandatory referral scheme. That is, we show that the specialists￿loss of patientele when patients can
only contact them after a GP referral has important consequences for the viability of the specialist types
whose entry decisions are strategic substitutes in GPs entry decisions.
To estimate the strategic interaction e⁄ects, we model the entry decisions of di⁄erent physician types
as an equilibrium entry game of incomplete information and sequential decision making. This model
permits identi￿cation of the nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects as it does not rely on restrictive
assumptions on the underlying payo⁄ functions and allows for the strategic interaction e⁄ects to be
asymmetric in sign. At the same time, the model remains computationally tractable and allows for
su¢ cient ￿rm heterogeneity.
Our ￿ndings for the Belgian physician markets, in which there is no gatekeeping, indicate that entry
decisions of dermatologists and pediatricians are strategic substitutes in the entry decisions of GPs,
whereas the presence of gynecologists, ophthalmologists and throat, nose and ear-specialists has a positive
impact on GP payo⁄s of entry. Our results thus indicate that transition costs are likely upon the
implementation of gatekeeping and that these costs are mainly associated to the viability of dermatologists
and pediatricians.
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11 Introduction
In health systems with gatekeeping, patients can access secondary care only following a referral from their
general practitioner (GP).1 Since the presence of a gatekeeper is believed to contribute to e¢ ciency and cost
containment, policy makers in countries without gatekeeping are increasingly interested in the adoption of
a mandatory referral scheme. France for example introduced a system of non compulsory coordinated care
pathways for patients in January 2005, which includes the introduction of a preferred GP scheme and a
reduction in patients￿freedom of choice through ￿nancial incentives (HealthPolicyMonitor). Belgium and
Germany recently introduced price di⁄erences between referred specialist visits and self-referrals and ￿nancial
incentives are given to register with a preferred GP.2
The introduction of (elements of) gatekeeping however changes the entire organization of health care
provision and a⁄ects the market opportunities for health providers. As a mandatory referral scheme restricts
access to specialists, secondary care remains only available for those patients that really require it. Whereas
this explains the believed e¢ ciency bene￿t, it also entails a possible loss in viability for the current body
of specialists. That is, the specialists￿patientele will drop to the extent that patients were using their
free choice of health provider to consume secondary care while GP care would have su¢ ced (i.e. patients
wrongly self-refer). As a result, the changing market opportunities can lead to a decrease in the number of
specialists that is sustained in the market. The related transition costs are relevant for the policy debate on
the introduction of gatekeeping. Amongst others, policy makers have to decide whether or not to maintain
the entire body of specialists through ￿nancial mechanisms or to retrain a portion of them.3
Quantifying the extent to which di⁄erent specialist types are likely to be threatened in their viability is
however hard. Constructing a direct measure would require detailed patient-level or specialist-level data,
with an objective measure of the necessity of secondary care. As this data is not available, this paper suggests
studying the strategic interaction e⁄ects of specialist types on GP payo⁄s as a proxy of this threat.4
But the nature of the strategic interactions between general practitioners and specialists is a priori not
clear. That is, there are arguments for both complementarity and substitutability of their services. On the
one hand, GPs and specialists are intended to be complementary: the GP is trained to have a very broad
1To be more speci￿c, gatekeeping is present in a health care system if the following three criteria are ful￿lled: Enrolment
of patients with a speci￿ed GP for a ￿xed period of time; payment for GPs is mainly by capitation per enrolled patient; and
specialist care is usually only granted following referral by a GP (De Maeseneer et al 1999). This paper focuses on the mandatory
referral scheme (element 3) in the discussion on gatekeeping.
2For the US, 70% of all Americans with health insurance were enrolled in some form of managed care plan (Gried 2000).
Several of the HMOs also practice gatekeeping. Recently, however, some HMOs have relaxed the restrictions on access to
specialists (Ferris et al 2001).
3Also, the network incentives for GPs and specialists will increase substantially, resulting in an additional change in market
conduct and market structure.
4Throughout the paper, we assume that only GPs will be assigned as gatekeepers. Gynecologists and pediatricians are thus
not allowed to act as the primary care doctor for certain population groups. A US study by Kirk et al (1998) indicates that
only a minority of gynecologists identify themselves as primary care providers.
2knowledge on all current medical problems and can refer the more complicated and more care intensive cases
to specialists, who are in turn better trained in specialized ￿elds. GPs thus bene￿t from the presence of a
specialist as they can refer when it would otherwise require a lot of e⁄ort to treat the patient. We refer to this
as the referral e⁄ect. On the other hand, to some extent GPs and specialists deliver the same services, i.e.
they diagnose patients and propose (and possibly perform) a treatment. Mainly when patients can choose
freely among health providers, specialists are competing for patients with GPs.5 This is referred to as the
competition e⁄ect. Whereas GPs bene￿t from the option to refer, they thus also risk that patients visit the
specialist directly. This is especially detrimental for GPs when it concerns health problems GPs can treat at
reasonable costs. With both e⁄ects present, it is not clear a priori whether the referral or the competition
e⁄ect dominates the strategic interactions between GPs and di⁄erent specialist types. Furthermore, this
critically depends on the type of specialist and the regulatory framework in which health professionals are
active.
We argue that specialist types whose presence currently has a negative impact on GP payo⁄s are most
likely to experience viability problems upon the introduction of a mandatory referral scheme. That is, the
negative e⁄ect indicates that the competition e⁄ect dominates the referral e⁄ect. Furthermore, it shows that
many patients self-refer to specialists while often specialist care is not required. This is exactly the ￿ ow of
patients that is excluded under a mandatory referral scheme.
To infer whether the competition or the referral e⁄ect dominates the strategic interaction of di⁄erent
specialist types with GPs, we model their entry decisions as a strategic game in the tradition of Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991a) and Mazzeo (2002). The paper proposes the use of a sequential incomplete information
game to answer the research question. These modeling assumptions avoid issues of non-existence of equilibria
in case the strategic interaction e⁄ects are asymmetric in sign. They furthermore avoid restrictions on the
underlying payo⁄ function with respect to the e⁄ect of other-type ￿rms, while allowing for su¢ cient ￿rm
heterogeneity. Contrary to most models in the literature, our model thus has the appropriate ￿ exibility
to identify the nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects, while it remains computationally tractable. We
apply the structural entry model to the Belgian physician markets, which are characterized by free choice of
physician and a fee-for-service system. We simultaneously estimate the drivers of pro￿tability and strategic
interaction e⁄ects for GPs and di⁄erent specialist types.
Our results indicate that specialist types bene￿t from the presence of GPs in the market. On the other
hand, the e⁄ect of specialists on GP payo⁄s depends on the specialization ￿eld. Dermatologists and pediatri-
5Newhouse (1990): "In reality, however, there is a certain amount of competition among specialties; this is perhaps most
apparent between a general (or family) practitioner, on the one hand, and a general internist (or general pediatrician) on the
other hand, but almost all specialists perform some services or procedures that other specialists also perform." (p.211)
3cians have a negative impact on GP payo⁄s, while the entry decisions of gynecologists, ophthalmologists and
throat, nose and ear-specialists (TNE) are strategic complements to the entry decision of GPs. No signi￿cant
e⁄ect is found for psychiatrists and physiologists. Our ￿ndings therefore indicate that dermatologists and
pediatricians attract a lot of patients for whom GP care would su¢ ce, while the patientele of gynecologists,
ophthalmologists and TNE-specialists either get referred or correctly self-refer to these specialist types. We
thus expect considerable transition costs when gatekeeping would be introduced in the Belgian care system.
Especially dermatologists and pediatricians are likely to experience a fall in the demand for their services,
which can result in viability problems.
There is a large literature that evaluates the e¢ ciency gains and the quality or budget e⁄ects of the
presence of a gatekeeper in health care systems (Kulu-Glasgow et al 1998, Delnoij et al 2000, Gerdtham
and J￿nsson 2000, Ferris et al 2001, Brekke et al 2007). This paper deviates from the literature as we
instead start from the observation that several European countries (e.g. Germany, France and Belgium) are
currently introducing elements of gatekeeping. Policy makers seem to be convinced that the arguments in
favor of gatekeeping outweigh the possible negative e⁄ects. Although we perform no welfare analysis, we
want to increase awareness of the transition costs that accompany the change in the health care system due
to changing market opportunities for health providers. Our analysis is furthermore related to the literature
on managed care (Glied 2000) and physician behavior, such as on the referral practice of GPs (Marinoso and
Jelovac 2003), on the degree of specialization in the care markets (Baumgardner 1988, Newhouse 1990) and
on the competitive behavior between experts and non-experts (Bouckaert and Degryse 2000).
The methodology used in this paper contributes to the growing literature on equilibrium models of entry.
Traditionally, the focus of modeling entry decisions of di⁄erent ￿rm types has been on questions of product
di⁄erentiation: are ￿rm payo⁄s a⁄ected to the same extent by the entry of other-type ￿rms as they are by
the entry of same-type ￿rms? The literature provides a wide range of applications such as on the competition
between airlines (Berry 1992, Ciliberto and Tamer 2004), between motels (Mazzeo 2002) and between banks
(Cohen and Mazzeo 2007). There are only few examples that cover positive strategic interaction e⁄ects, i.e.
strategic complementarity (Sweeting 2007, Schaumans and Verboven 2008). The current paper distinguishes
itself from previous work as it is a priori not clear how the strategic interaction e⁄ects are characterized. As
a result, we do not follow the common practice of making restrictive assumptions on the e⁄ect on payo⁄s
of other-type ￿rms to construct a well-de￿ned likelihood function. That is, we do not restrict the strategic
interaction e⁄ects to be negative or positive. Furthermore, we do not impose the interaction e⁄ects to be
symmetric in sign. The latter is needed as we can not exclude that e.g. GPs are strategic complements for
specialists￿payo⁄s, while these specialists are strategic substitutes in the entry decision of GPs.
4The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 by discussing the characteristics of the or-
ganization of health care markets in Belgium and issues of gatekeeping. We explain how identi￿cation of
strategic interaction e⁄ects between physician types translates into the probability of viability issues upon
the introduction of gatekeeping. Section 3 presents the entry model to determine the strategic interaction
e⁄ects and discusses the particular strengths of the model given the research question. Section 4 follows with
the data description and the empirical implementation of the equilibrium model to the Belgian physician
markets. The results of the analyses are presented and discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Organization of Health care Markets
Before introducing the equilibrium model of entry to identify strategic interaction e⁄ects between GPs and
di⁄erent specialist types, we brie￿ y discuss the characteristics and the organization of the primary and
secondary health care in Belgium. We focus on the entry requirements, the conduct and the interaction
between physician types. We continue with some background on the literature on gatekeeping and focus on
providing additional intuition on how the estimation of an entry model is of interest for the discussion on
the introduction of mandatory referral schemes.
2.1 The Belgian Health care Market
The delivery of health care in Belgium is mainly private and based on the principles of independent medical
practice. The Belgian health care market is characterized by a high physician density. For 2005, we account
for the presence of one GP per 859 inhabitants. Furthermore, for a total population of about ten million
there are close to 40;000 active physicians (GPs and specialists), which makes Belgium the second most
physician dense country of Europe, after Greece (OECD Health Data). The high availability of medical care
is also associated with a high consumption level of care services: Belgians on average have 4:6 contacts with
a GP and 2:3 contacts with specialists per year.
Entry into the medical professions is conditional on minimum educational standards (licensing). First
of all, because of the high physician density in Belgium, the government decided in 1998 to limit the in￿ ow
of professionals. This regulation is transposed in the Flemish region (North) to restrictions on the in￿ ow
of students for medical studies, whereas the Walloon region (South) opted for a limitation further in the
educational cycle. All medical students start with a six-year program, which covers the basics for all physician
types, followed by a one-year introduction to the preferred specialization, which mostly consists of internships.
5After this initial period of seven years, medical students start their study of a specialty to obtain a license to
practise: such ￿elds of specialization include e.g. general medicine, gynecology and dermatology. Again, there
exists a restriction on the number of students that can start in each specialization ￿eld. These further studies
consist of two years of internships and seminars for GPs and on average 5 years of study and internships
for the di⁄erent specialist types. It should be noted that retraining to another specialization ￿eld is very
rare: also retraining from a specialist type to a GP requires additional study. Apart from these educational
requirements and some administration, entry in the Belgian physician markets is free. That is, a certi￿ed
and registered physician of any type can choose to locate an o¢ ce anywhere in Belgium.6
Most GPs operate solo, frequently without any sta⁄ except perhaps a medical secretary.7 GPs typically
perform a combination of open o¢ ce hours, appointments and home visits. Furthermore, most GPs are
enrolled in a local system of night and weekend duty to ensure availability of primary care at all times.
Specialists are on the other hand often associated to hospitals. However, some ￿elds of specializations do not
necessarily require the hospital environment for their services, which results in a situation in which specialists
have several o¢ ces: one within the hospital and a private practice. Depending on the type, patients there-
fore often visit specialists outside the hospital: this is especially the case for dermatologists, pediatricians,
ophthalmologists and gynecologists (about 50% of all specialist visits). In this context, specialists typically
perform consultations on appointment.
Both GPs and specialists are in general remunerated through fee-for-service payment where fee levels
are set at the national level by the Convention Committee of the mutualities and physicians. As a result,
a drop in workload directly translates into a decrease of income. The fee-for-service system furthermore
prevents price competition amongst physicians of the same type. A consultation with a specialist is however
substantially more expensive than a GP contact: in January 2005, patients￿copayment for a consultation
was 3:29e with a GP, while the patient pays on average more than 10e for a specialist contact. Although
there is no price competition and furthermore self-regulation traditionally prevented physicians to compete
through advertising, physicians do however have a wide range of other instruments they can use to compete
with: quality of treatment, time spend on a consultation, availability, home visits (for GPs), waiting time
and so on.
6This is in contrast to the regulation in some neighboring countries. In The Netherlands and Germany, there is regulation
on the number of physicians per local market. Belgium has similar regulation for the pharmacy market. Adjustments to the
entry model for these entry restrictions for the study of these markets are demonstrated in Schaumans and Verboven (2008).
775% of the population indicates visiting a GP that operates solo (WIV, 2006). The percentage of GPs working solo is
expected to be a bit higher than this. Note that there are centers, known as integrated health care practices, which operate
as a multidisciplinary team. The number of such practices is growing, although there is still only a small minority of people
a¢ liated to them. Our dataset however does not allow us to identify them.
6The Belgian health care system does not include a gatekeeping role for GPs. Neither referral nor enrolment
system is in place. There is free choice of physician and since the functions and roles of most health care
personnel have not been clearly de￿ned, specialists often form the ￿rst point of contact. Therefore, as
discussed in the introduction, GPs bene￿t from the presence of specialists as they can refer to them, but at
the same time their presence is a source of competition. Note that for specialists, referrals are likely to be
less costly as the initial tests have already been performed and the health problem is very likely to match
the specialist￿ s expertise.
A study by WIV (2006) on the utilization of medical services in Belgium reports that about 6% of GP
contacts end in a referral to a specialist. The bulk of specialist contacts concerns follow-ups: only 31% of
specialist contacts are new, compared to 82% for GPs. Furthermore, about 55% of these new contacts occur
on the patient￿ s own initiative. However, there is a large di⁄erence according to the type of specialist: for
contacts to dermatologists (gynecologists), patients initiate 68% (67%) of the contacts, whereas for internists
or (neuro-) psychiatrists only resp. 41% and 26% of the contacts are self-referrals. The high frequency of self-
referred specialist contacts suggests that specialists are responsible for limiting the demand for GP services.
We however have no indication on the character of the complaint and thus on whether or not a GP would
be able to treat these patients. A study in the Netherlands, one of Belgium￿ s neighboring countries, though
indicates that patients self-refer for medical complaints for which they expect to end up at the specialist
anyway and when the problem is considered to be speci￿c for the specialist (Kulu-Glasgow et al, 1998).
Remember that patients do have an incentive to contact a GP for general or minor health concerns, instead
of a specialist because of the price di⁄erence.
Containment of health expenditure has been on the political agenda since the eighties and in 1993, some
initiatives were launched to serve this purpose: amongst others there was a signi￿cant increase of copayment.
But with the challenges of ageing and the development of expensive new medical techniques, initiatives on
cost containment and e¢ ciency remain important. In 1999, the Belgian authorities started with ￿nancial
incentives for patients to participate in a system of enrolment with a preferred GP. Over the ￿rst ￿ve years,
more than 30% of the population already enrolled. Moreover, in 2004, 95% of the population indicates
having a regular GP (WIV 2006) and a 2001-survey of one of the Belgian mutualities indicates that 75% of
the patientele of a GP is loyal to his/her GP.8 This indicates that the majority of patients seem not to be
￿ shopping around￿as far as GP care is concerned. Secondly, as of February 1st, 2007 a specialist contact that
is not initiated by a GP referral has become more expensive for the patient, although the price di⁄erence of
8Loyalty is here de￿ned as not having any contacts with any other GP throughout the year. (Socialistische Mutualiteit,
￿ Flits￿Oktober 2001).
75e is only valid for one visit per year.9 It is thus clear that initial steps towards a gatekeeping system are
taken, while the debate on implementing a full gatekeeping system is still ongoing.
The characteristics of the Belgian health care markets motivate the modeling assumptions made in the
entry model presented in section 3. First, because of the educational requirements in the physician markets,
each ￿rm knows its type before the entry game starts. Entrants therefore make no type choice. Furthermore,
although licensing limits the total number of potential physician entrants, the lack of restrictions on the
number of entrants in a local market implies that the pool of entrants for a speci￿c local market is large.10
Second, since the majority of GPs still operate in a solo-practice and because data availability prevents
identifying those physicians connected to a group or hospital, we treat all entry decisions as individual
decisions. The presence of hospitals will however be an important indicator for the pro￿tability of mainly
specialist types.
2.2 Gatekeeping
Gatekeeping delegates the responsibility of the use of all secondary care to GPs through their referral
behavior (Scott, 2000). As such, GPs are in charge of e⁄ectively and e¢ ciently guiding patients through
the health care system. The introduction of gatekeeping is therefore believed to make the use of secondary
care more e¢ cient. That is, an informed player (the GP) decides on the use of the expertise of specialists
rather than patients, who are subject to uncertainty, asymmetric information and moral hazard (Arrow
1963). Furthermore, as the GP becomes the primary coordinator and communicator, the enhanced long run
relationship can further increase e¢ ciency as it allows taking the more general background of the patient
into account. Gatekeeping is also believed to contribute to cost control, as it prevents wasteful duplication
of diagnostic tests and unnecessary use of expensive secondary care (Franks et al 1992). These possible cost
(quality) and e¢ ciency gains of a gatekeeping role for GPs make legislators prone to implement it in their
health system.11
Although the arguments in favor of gatekeeping seem convincing, there is actually little empirical evidence
for the believed e¢ ciency and cost bene￿ts. For example, Barros (1998) and Delnoij et al (2000) both ￿nd
9De Artsenkrant, No. 87 (31/01/2007). Note that because we are working on data prior to the introduction of the fee-
di⁄erential related to a referral, the model is able to capture the way specialists and GPs interact in the absence of gatekeeping.
10To the extent that there are too few licensed physicians to cover the di⁄erent geographic markets, the model changes in the
constant term: the positive payo⁄ condition to trigger entry is then replaced by the condition of payo⁄s higher than the best
alternative. This is just a matter of normalization of the outside option.
11A bit simpli￿ed, more or less half of the Western-European countries do restrict access to secondary care by referral (UK,
Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal), whereas the other half do not delegate this role to their
GPs (Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Greece and Austria). The United States is characterized
by a mixed system, depending on the patient￿ s choice of health insurance. Patients that are enrolled in an HMO are generally
monitored by a gatekeeper, whereas patients that choose to sign in on a PPO have direct access to all care. However, several
HMO￿ s in the US are gradually opening up access to specialist care for their enrolled patients (e.g. Harvard Vanguard Medical
Associates). Source: CESifo 2000 DICE, Boerma 2002.
8that the magnitude of health expenditure is not a⁄ected by the presence of a gatekeeping role. The only
e⁄ect they can account for is a slower increase in the costs (for ambulatory care) in time. Ferris et al (2001)
￿nd little evidence of substantial changes in the use of specialty services by US HMO members in the ￿rst
18 months after abolishing gatekeeping and Nivel (2003) indicates that gatekeepers are in general not better
informed about their patients.12 Brekke et al (2007) furthermore suggests that gatekeeping can be associated
with overspecialization and excessive quality competition and survey results indicate a lack of support by
patients and physicians for the introduction of gatekeeping. Also the danger of diagnostic delay is used as
an argument against the introduction of gatekeeping.
An additional argument against the implementation of gatekeeping concerns costs related to altering an
existing care system based on free choice towards a system with mandatory referrals. One such transition
cost is directly related to the viability of the active professionals.
In a system with free choice, a patient can visit a specialist or a GP, irrespective of whether or not
he/she requires specialist care. In case the patient needs specialist care, the GP will refer the patient to
the appropriate specialist. The choice of directly contacting a specialist reduces transaction costs in case
the patient would end up with this specialist type either way, but holds the risk of paying a higher fee than
necessary (when one could have been treated by the GP) or the risk of delay or a wrong treatment (when
the patient visits the wrong type of specialist). With the introduction of gatekeeping, the option of directly
visiting the specialist is excluded. All patients visit the GP in a ￿rst instance and only those that need
specialist care are redirected to the appropriate specialist type. This implies that specialists loose a part of
their patientele: those patients that only need GP care will no longer end up in the specialist￿ s o¢ ce. In
case specialists are paid according to a fee-for-service system, this drop in patientele directly a⁄ects their
pro￿tability. And to the extent that this ￿ ow of patients is important, the changing market opportunities
due to the installment of a gatekeeper a⁄ect the viability of specialists and therefore reduces the total number
of specialists that can operate in the market. This argument is in line with survey results from Germany
where specialists indicate to fear ￿nancial losses due to gatekeeping (Gress et al 2004).
For insights on the likelihood of these viability issues for a specialist type, we rely on the strategic
interaction e⁄ect of this type of specialists on the entry decision of GPs. This strategic interaction e⁄ect
captures whether GP payo⁄s are increasing or rather decreasing in the number of specialists in the market.
12Evidence on the general health outcomes would be instructive in the discussion but is hard to come by. There is some
indirect evidence that gatekeeping has a positive e⁄ect on health outcomes in Macinko et al (2003). Here it is shown that
countries with a strong primary care system (Primary Care score test) are more successful in preventing mortality. Since
countries with gatekeeping generally have a stronger primary care system, the positive relation might carry through (Gress et
al, 2004).
9To facilitate the discussion, take for now that GP payo⁄s are given by variable pro￿ts minus ￿xed costs:
￿GP = q ￿ S ￿ (p ￿ mc) ￿ F
with q the average number of patient￿ s contacts with a GP, S the total number of patients, p the ￿xed fee,
mc the average marginal cost of a contact and F the ￿xed costs. GP payo⁄s are a⁄ected in di⁄erent ways
by the presence of specialists. First, it allows GPs to refer complicated or care intensive cases which reduces
the average marginal costs of treatment for the GP (mc). In general, payo⁄s are thus higher when specialists
are present in the market, due to the referral e⁄ect.13 Second though, patients can contact the specialist
instead of the GP (competition e⁄ect). This implies a drop of the average number of contacts a patient has
with the GP (q). However, when patients self-select and only go to the specialist directly when they actually
need specialist care, the drop in the number of contacts is associated with a drop in GP marginal costs.
It is therefore especially when most patients wrongly diagnose themselves as in need of specialist care that
GP payo⁄s will decrease due to the competition e⁄ect. That is, average marginal costs do not drop, while
patients contact the GP less frequently.
When GP payo⁄s are increasing in the number of specialists of a certain type, the bene￿ts of referrals
outweigh the costs of competition (strategic complementarity). Patients that require the care of these
specialists thus mainly access secondary care through the GP (high referral e⁄ect) and only few patients
misdiagnose themselves in their self-referred visits to specialists (low competition e⁄ect). On the other hand,
payo⁄s decreasing in the number of specialists of a type indicate that the competition e⁄ect dominates
the referral e⁄ect (strategic substitutes). Patients access secondary care primarily through self-referral (or
more precisely, GPs rarely need to refer patients to this specialist type), while many of them don￿ t require
specialist care (high competition e⁄ect).
Again, the introduction of a mandatory referral scheme excludes the possibility of patients to access
secondary care directly. All patients that previously visited specialists while GP care would have su¢ ced
will no longer be part of the specialist￿ s patientele. Given the previous discussion, we know that this will
especially threaten the viability of those specialist types that negatively a⁄ect GP payo⁄s. That is, for these
specialist types, the loss of patientele will be substantial.
13Whereas the number of visits of these patients to the GP drops, the availability of the GP increases, which could coun-
terbalance the drop in number of visits. That is, other patients visit the GP more frequently as the shadow price of care
(=monetary+transportation costs+waiting costs) decreases.
103 Entry Model
In this section, we present a static entry model to estimate the strategic interaction e⁄ects between specialist
types and GPs. This allows us to determine whether the competition e⁄ect or the referral e⁄ect dominates
the impact of specialist types on GP payo⁄s. In turn, this is instructive for the likelihood of viability threats
for a specialist type once gatekeeping is introduced: the pro￿tability of mainly specialist types whose entry
decisions are strategic substitutes for the entry decision of GPs will be a⁄ected (section 2.2).
We propose to model the entry decisions of the di⁄erent types of physicians as a sequential game of
incomplete information with ￿rm heterogeneity: ￿rms have private information about their payo⁄s in a
market and the types make their entry decisions in a pre-speci￿ed order. We start this section by introducing
the model set up, ￿rm behavior and the equilibrium of the game. This is followed by a discussion on the choice
of the modeling assumptions: the model is especially designed to identify the signs of strategic interaction
e⁄ects, while allowing for su¢ cient ￿rm heterogeneity and asymmetric strategic interaction e⁄ects. We
contrast our model mainly to models of complete information.
3.1 The Empirical Model
The empirical model to tackle our research question is closest related to the incomplete information game
in Einav (2003). In a study to explain the observed demand patterns in the movie industry, Einav presents
a sequential game of incomplete information to explain the timing decision of movie distributors: Each
￿rm makes a zero/one decision for the ￿ entry￿of the movie in a time horizon. Our model di⁄ers in two
respects. First, in our setting ￿rms make decisions to enter geographic markets. The unit of observation
is therefore a local market as opposed to a point in time. Second and more importantly, the setting of
Einav concerns few potential entrants with observable heterogeneity, for which he considers the timing
decision separately. This paper on the other hand groups physicians into homogeneous types and looks
at the aggregate decision of each physician type. We thus study the equilibrium number of entrants per
type, which increases the dimensionality of the model. We subsequently present ￿rm payo⁄s of entering the
market and the assumptions of the game and discuss ￿rm behavior and the conditions under which a market
structure is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
3.1.1 Set-up and payo⁄s
Let the set of players in market m be grouped in T types, with Ft potential ￿rms of type t (t 2 [1;T]). The
action space of all players consists of entering or not entering the market. Following the discussion in section
112.1 (and as in Einav 2003), ￿rms are considered to be individual decision makers and are not ex ante the
same.14 Each ￿rm knows its type before the entry game starts and all types have a large pool of potential
entrants. We denote GPs as ￿rms of type 1 and the di⁄erent specialist types are assigned type 2 to type T.
While payo⁄s of not entering the market are normalized to zero, we represent payo⁄s of a ￿rm f of type t
entering market m by the following reduced form:
￿m
f;t = ￿ ￿t(Xm;nm
1 ;:::;nm
t ) ￿ "m
f;t








Firm payo⁄s depend on market characteristics (Xm, such as the number of inhabitants) and the entry deci-
sions of other ￿rms. Type-speci￿c coe¢ cients allow for the payo⁄s to vary across types. Furthermore, payo⁄s
vary across (same-type) ￿rms because of ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics. These ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics are
assumed to be unobserved by both the researcher and other ￿rms ("m
f;i), although the distribution of the
random variable of which the private information is a realization is known by all players.15 Since ￿rms of the
same type are therefore observationally the same, the exact identity of the entrants of a type is irrelevant
for payo⁄s. Instead, payo⁄s are a⁄ected by the realized number of entrants of the di⁄erent types in the
market (nm
1 ;:::;nm
T ). Consistent with the existing literature, same-type ￿rms are strategic substitutes, so
that payo⁄s are decreasing in the number of ￿rms of the own type: ￿t < 0.16 For the e⁄ect on payo⁄s of the
number of entrants of other types, we make a simplifying assumption:
￿tj = 0 8t 6= 1;j 6= 1
It is assumed that payo⁄s of all specialist types (t 6= 1) are a⁄ected only by the number of own-type rivals and
by the number of GPs in the market. In other words, the entry decisions of ￿rms of di⁄erent specialist types
are independent from each other, at least in ￿rst order: there remain some indirect e⁄ects between specialist
types through their simultaneous e⁄ect on the GP market. The restriction on the strategic interaction e⁄ects
reduces the computational burden of the model to a considerable extent, so that it allows for the estimation
14This is in contrast with for example Mazzeo (2002), where ￿rms make both an entry decision and a type decision. In his
setting, all ￿rms are ex ante homogenous.
15The ￿rm-level error can be interpreted as both non-strategic considerations that make some players more likely to choose
to enter this speci￿c market or as an optimization error (Einav 2003).
16Note that we use this assumption in deriving the equilibrium behavior of the ￿rms, but do not restrict the related coe¢ cient
in the estimation procedure. Instead, the data demonstrates this competitive e⁄ect.
12of a high degree of ￿rm heterogeneity. Given the characteristics of the application, the assumption is not
strong: specialists rarely refer patients directly to other specialist types.17;18 Note that GPs￿payo⁄s (type
1) on the other hand are a⁄ected by the number of physicians of all types.
In contrast to most of the existing empirical literature, we make no assumptions on the signs of the
strategic interaction e⁄ects. Instead, estimation of the model will yield insights on this. A negative e⁄ect
(￿tj < 0) indicates that the entry decisions of type-j ￿rms are strategic substitutes to the entry decision of
￿rms of type t: the entry of a type-j ￿rm in the market yields an additional competitive e⁄ect. A positive
e⁄ect (￿tj > 0) on the contrary implies strategic complementarity in the entry decisions for ￿rms of type t as
payo⁄s of entering a market increase in the number of other-type ￿rms. Furthermore, the strategic interaction
e⁄ects between any two types of ￿rms are allowed to be asymmetric, both in magnitude (￿12 6= ￿21) and
in sign (￿12 < 0 & ￿21 > 0). The latter is a particular strength of the model and worth elaborating on:
for expositional reasons we delay the discussion to section 3.2. Remark that the current application cannot
exclude the possibility of this asymmetry in sign: whereas specialists are expected to be positively a⁄ected
by the entry decision of GPs, the competitive e⁄ect can dominate the strategic e⁄ect of a specialist type on
GP payo⁄s.
With ￿rms￿payo⁄s of entering market m at hand, we model their entry decisions as a strategic three-stage
game: in the ￿rst stage, all potential entrants of type 1 simultaneously make their entry decisions. In the
second stage, type-2 to type-T players simultaneously decide on entry. When all potential entrants made
their entry decisions, all ￿rms that have entered market m interact with each other and payo⁄s are realized.
Two remarks are in place. First, the assumption that GPs make their entry choices ￿rst is motivated by
the consideration that a GP￿ s patientele is mainly trust-based and very local whereas this is rather reputation-
based in the specialists￿markets. As such, GPs sunk costs of entering a speci￿c local market and therefore
their commitment power is higher.19 Second, because of the assumption on the strategic independence of
specialists types, the simultaneous entry stage for all specialist types (stage 2) yields the exact same market
equilibrium as a game in which the di⁄erent types would enter sequentially in a pre-speci￿ed order: the
second stage would then consist of (T ￿ 1) stages (see Einav 2003).
17The restriction is more severe within the context of a hospital in which specialists do ￿ refer￿to each other. As our dataset
does not allow us to identify which specialists are associated to which hospital, we can however not control for this. The number
of hospital beds will however be taken up as an explanatory variable in the estimation of the model, to partly control for this.
18In case the application does not allow to make similar simplifying assumptions on the strategic interaction e⁄ects, the
researcher has to go back to a (T + 1)-stage game, in which a precise order is speci￿ed (see Einav 2003 for the consequences).
19This is in contrast with the general argument that material investments to enter a market as a specialist are higher. Note
though that these costs are not market-speci￿c. To the extent that specialists are mainly associated to hospitals, their sunk
costs can be higher, which would justify a reverse order of play. The current sequence of entry decisions is however convenient
as it reduces computational burden in the presence of more than two types. Finally, note that instead of making an assumption
on the sequence of entry, Einav (2003) allows to estimate the likelihood of the di⁄erent orders of play. This however requires
that the dataset is very rich.
133.1.2 Firm behavior and Equilibrium
As payo⁄s contain a private information component, ￿rms make entry decisions based on their expected
payo⁄s of entry. Each ￿rm forms its expectation on payo⁄s using all observable information in the market
and the private realization of its unobservables, together with a conjecture on the actions of all other ￿rms.
Note that the choice behavior depends only on the expected actions of other ￿rms and not on the exact
realizations of the unobservables of the other ￿rms (as is the case in complete information games). Using
this information, each ￿rm decides whether or not to enter the local market m. Since ￿rms are assumed to
be rational payo⁄s maximizers, ￿rms enter when they deem it to be pro￿table. Therefore, in the long run,
the equilibrium market structure in market m consists of the maximum number of ￿rms that is viable, given
their product di⁄erentiation.
Firms furthermore decide according to a pre-speci￿ed order of play: GPs (type 1) are the ￿rst-movers
while the di⁄erent specialist types simultaneously decide in the second stage of the game. As a result, the
model can be solved backwardly for its perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Einav 2003).
Second stage
In the second stage of the game, type-1 ￿rms have already made their entry decisions and the Ft potential
entrants of the other types t (t 2 [2;T]) now simultaneously decide on entry in market m. They use all
available information and thus condition their choice behavior on the observed number of type-1 entrants
(N1 = nm
1 ). Furthermore, the entry decisions are independent across type. Given the payo⁄ speci￿cation in
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For notational convenience, we often refer to the deterministic part of these expected conditional payo⁄s
as E (￿ ￿m
t jnm
1 ).With all other determinants of payo⁄s observed, type-t ￿rms only conjecture on the choice
behavior of their own-type rivals to form their expected payo⁄s. Each individual type-t ￿rm enters the
market when its private information realization allows pro￿table entry, given the expected market structure:
E(￿ ￿m
t jnm
1 ) ￿ "m
f;t.
14As payo⁄s of all ￿rms of the same type are observationally symmetric and the distribution of the private
information is common knowledge (G), all ￿rms of type t have in equilibrium the same conjecture on the
number of entrants of its type in market m. That is, ￿rm f￿ s conjectured probability of a rival ￿rm g entering
the market is the same as the probability of any other rival entering and also the same as the conjecture any

















1 )).20 This also implies that the probability of being viable in a market with (nm
1 ;nm
t ) entrants
is the same for all ￿rms of type t. As a result, the probability that the equilibrium market structure consists
of nm
t entrants of type t coincides with the probability that a single ￿rm is pro￿table (and thus enters) given
this market structure but would not be pro￿table in the presence of an additional competitor (i.e. nm
t + 1
entrants). For any realization of the number of type-1 ￿rms (N1 = nm
1 ), the probability that in the Nash
equilibrium, nt ￿rms of type t (t 2 [2;T]) enter market m can be written as:21
Pr(Nt = nm
t jnm
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Potential entrants of type 1 make their entry decisions ￿rst and decide based on their expected payo⁄s of
entering market m. In contrast to the second movers, type-1 ￿rms conjecture on the choice behavior of their
own-type rivals and of the ￿rms of all other types:
E(￿m
f;1) = E(￿ ￿1(Xm;N1;N2;:::;NT) ￿ "m
f;1






The potential entrants however anticipate on the choice behavior of type-t ￿rms: their decision rules are
deduced from their equilibrium behavior in the second stage of the game as given in expression (3). Note
20In the presence of ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics, type-t ￿rms can be considered as heterogeneous and not only the number
but also the identity of the entrants becomes relevant for payo⁄s. Expectations can then di⁄er across ￿rms (Seim 2007).
21Remark that we get the same probability of observing a market structure as in the case where the error term is the same
for and observed by all type-t physicians (only!). This is due to the symmetry assumption.
15that the decision rules of the type-2 to type-T ￿rms depend on the realization of the number of entrants of
type 1 so that the expectation of the number of other-type ￿rms depends directly on the expectation of the
number of same-type rivals. The expected number of ￿rms of type 2 to type T in market m in the payo⁄s of
type-1 ￿rms (E(Nt) in expression 4) can thus be updated by integrating out over the probability of observing
nm






t jE(N1)) ￿ nm
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As a result, the expected payo⁄s can be written to only depend on the expectation of the number of
entrants of the own type (E(￿ ￿1(Xm;N1;N2;:::;NT) = E(￿ ￿1(Xm;N1)). The symmetry of the payo⁄s of
type-1 ￿rms and the common knowledge of the distribution of the private information component implies
that all GPs form the same equilibrium conjecture on the number of entrants. Furthermore, individual
rational behavior yields conditions for the equilibrium number of type-1 ￿rms entering the market. That
is, the probability that a market structure with nm
1 ￿rms of type 1 is a Nash equilibrium, is given by the
probability of a type-1 ￿rm being pro￿table in the presence of nm
1 rivals, but unpro￿table with an additional
entrant in the market:
Pr(N1 = nm
1 ) = Pr
￿
E(￿ ￿1(Xm;nm
1 )) > "m
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Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
From the second stage of the game, we derive the equilibrium behavior of all ￿rms of type 2 to type T (i.e.
of all specialist types) conditional on the number of entrants of type 1. In the ￿rst stage of the game, we
deduced the equilibrium number of type-1 entrants that realizes taking into account the reactions of the
other types to these entry decisions. In sum, the assumption of rational ￿rm behavior yields a probability
of observing a number of ￿rms of any type in the market (equations (3) and (6)). Combining both stages,
the probability of observing market structure (n1;n2;:::;nT) in market m is described by:
Pr (N1 = nm
1 ;N2 = nm
2 ;:::;NT = nm
T )
= Pr(N1 = nm
1 ) ￿ Pr(N2 = nm
2 jnm
1 ) ￿ ::: ￿ Pr(NT = nm
T jnm
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16Given a speci￿cation of the reduced form payo⁄function for ￿rm types and an assumption on the distribution
of the private information, the estimation proceeds through the maximization of a likelihood function, where
every market is treated as an independent game. With nm
￿
t the observed number of entrants of type t in
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The entry model put forward in section 3.1 is one of incomplete information and ￿rms deciding in a pre-
speci￿ed order. These modeling assumptions are used explicitly to meet the requirements of the research
question at hand:
1. We intend to identify the sign of the strategic interaction e⁄ects between di⁄erent physician types.
2. We cannot exclude the possibility that the strategic interaction e⁄ects between GPs and a specialist
type are asymmetric in sign. That is, GPs￿payo⁄s might decrease in the number of a specialist type,
while this specialist type bene￿ts from the presence of GPs in the market.
3. There exists a lot of di⁄erent types of physicians: GPs, dermatologists, pediatricians, gynecologists,
psychiatrists, and so on. We thus want to allow for su¢ cient ￿rm heterogeneity (at least more than
two ￿rm-types).
The bulk of the literature considers games of complete information: all characteristics of payo⁄s are
common knowledge for the ￿rms, including the realization of the error terms. Therefore, the action of
every ￿rm depends not only on the realization of its own unobservables, but also on the realization of the
unobservables of the other potential entrants. We use a graphical representation of the entry game to show
that when the information set is complete, the probability of observing a market structure critically depends
on the nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects. Figure 1 represents the empirical model with two types and
one potential entrant for each type under complete information and simultaneous decision making for three
cases: (A) the interactions between ￿rms is given by strategic substitutability (payo⁄s of entry decrease in
the entry of the other type), (B) strategic complementarity in the entry decisions of both ￿rms (￿rms bene￿t
from the presence of the other type ￿rm) and (C) the strategic interaction e⁄ects are asymmetric in sign.
17The X-axis represents realizations of the unobservables of the ￿rm of type 1, whereas the Y-axis gives the
realizations of the unobservables of the type-2 ￿rm. The broken lines represent threshold values for entry: if
the realization of the own error term lies below this threshold value, rational ￿rm behavior prescribes ￿rms
to enter the market (e.g. ￿ ￿1(Xm;1;N2) ￿ "m
1 ). As this entry decision depends on the realization of the
error of the other-type ￿rm, each ￿rm has two threshold values, one for the entry decision when the ￿rm
is the only entrant (nm
￿i = 0) and one for the entry decision when the other ￿rm is present in the market
(nm
￿i = 1). Given the threshold values of both ￿rms, we can associate equilibrium market structures to error
term realizations. The areas associated with equilibrium market structures (nm
1 ,nm
2 ) are depicted on the
graphs.
The problem with complete information games should be clear directly: while we aim to identify the
nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects, the probability associated to a market structure depends on the
assumption made on the strategic interaction e⁄ects.22 In other words, when the researcher want to take a
complete information game to the data, de￿ning the likelihood function implies making an assumption on the
nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects. It is straightforward that we do not want to make such assumptions.
Moving towards a setting of incomplete information avoids this: ￿rms make their entry decisions based on
their expected payo⁄s, which consists of a conjecture of the likelihood of entry of the other ￿rm given
observable information on the other ￿rm￿ s payo⁄s. Firms use this conjecture to determine its entry decision:
the ￿rm will enter in case expected payo⁄s are positive (e.g. E(￿ ￿1(Xm;1;Nm
2 )) ￿ "m
f;1). Figure 2 gives
the graphical representation of the empirical game under incomplete information and simultaneous decision
making. Importantly, the same mapping results for the three possible cases of strategic interactions between
￿rms. That is, as opposed to the complete information game, each ￿rm only has one threshold value due
to the independence of its entry decision of the realization of the error term of the other-type ￿rm. The
strategic interactions between ￿rms however determine the level of these threshold values.
The second requirement of the empirical application is the fact that the strategic interactions need to
be ￿ exible. In a setting of complete information and pure equilibrium strategies, a game with strategic
interactions that are asymmetric in sign su⁄ers from issues of non-existence of an equilibrium for certain
realizations of the model primitives. In case one ￿rm is harmed by the presence of the other, while the
other ￿rm bene￿ts from the presence of the ￿rst, as depicted in panel C of Figure 1, it is possible that any
strategy by the players has a pro￿table deviation by at least one of them.23 For such realizations of the
22Look back at Figure 1, assuming without loss of generality that ￿rm 1 moves ￿rst (to solve for the multiplicity issue). The
equilibrium mapping for market structure (0;1) is a rectangle in the strategic complementarity case, whereas it takes a di⁄erent
form under the assumption that the entry decisions are strategic substitutes.
23The ￿rm of type 1 is willing to enter the market if it can be alone in the market. But in case the type-1 ￿rm enters, it is
optimal for the type-2 ￿rm to enter as well since its entry is pro￿table given this market structure. However, in the latter case,
the type-1 ￿rm would not be pro￿table.
18model primitives no equilibrium exists, so that no well-de￿ned likelihood function can be speci￿ed. Models
of complete information therefore do not only require the strategic interactions to be known a priori, but
also that the strategic interaction e⁄ects between two types have the same sign. When in contrast ￿rms
decide based on expectations of the actions of the other players, as in Figure 2, an equilibrium exists for all
realizations of the model primitives. Note though that while an equilibrium always exists, the incompleteness
of the information set gives rise to ex-post regret. That is, once the entry decisions of the other players become
clear, the ￿rm￿ s decision to (not) enter might not have been the optimal one. Remark furthermore that an
alternative solution to the non-existence problem in the complete information game consists of allowing for
mixed-strategy equilibria (Bajari et al 2007, Aradillas-Lopez 2007).
Whereas an equilibrium always exists in the incomplete information game, the issue of multiple equilibria
remains. For the same model primitives, the equilibrium conjecture on the behavior of other ￿rms might not
be unique (Berry and Reiss 2006). Most of the empirical work on incomplete information games constrains
the shape of the payo⁄function or assumes that the same equilibrium is chosen in similar markets to solve for
multiplicity concerns (Seim 2007, Aradillas-Lopez 2007, Vitorino 2007).24 However, as in games of complete
information, the assumption of sequentiality results in unique equilibria as well: the second mover conditions
its choice on the action of the ￿rst mover, so that the ￿rst mover can perfectly anticipate his choice behavior.
Given the sequentiality assumption, only the ￿rst mover is subject to ex-post regret (Einav 2003). For
the current application, we work with the sequentiality assumption to solve for the unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. For completeness, we add the graphical representation of this model with the ￿rm of type 1 as
the ￿rst mover in Figure 3, where panel A and panel B respectively present the case in which the ￿rm of
type 1 is a strategic substitute or a strategic complement in the entry decision of the type-2 ￿rm.25
Finally, allowing for a high degree of ￿rm heterogeneity is less demanding in an incomplete information
setting (Seim 2007). Within the complete information framework, specifying the conditions for which a
speci￿c market structure with e.g. three ￿rm-types is the equilibrium is complex: it results in complicated
regions of integration. Recent developments in the literature however do allow for estimating a higher degree
of ￿rm heterogeneity in this setting, but reduces identi￿cation to the set of models for which the data is
consistent (e.g. Ciliberto and Tamer 200426). Instead, an incomplete information setting retains point
24Sweeting (2007) is an exception as this paper uses the multiplicity of equilibria explicitly in the identi￿cation strategy.
25Note that the speci￿cation of this model is invariant to the nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ect: the relevant threshold
values for any market structure to be an equilibrium is the same in both panels.
26Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) does more than just dealing with the multiplicity concerns: they also allow for a ￿exible
estimation of the underlying payo⁄s through giving up on point identi￿cation of the model. This method implies that the data
itself will be used to determine how the areas of error term realizations connected to a certain market structure are de￿ned.
Computational burden however increases fast when the binary model is extended to estimating the number of ￿rms of a type
entering the market. Furthermore, although type speci￿c variables and exclusion restrictions are not per se needed, they help
reduce the bounds of the parameter set. Finally, an extension of the model is needed to allow for mixed equilibria when the
strategic interaction e⁄ects do not have the same sign. Apart from these technical drawbacks in the empirical implementation,
19identi￿cation while being less computationally intensive.
Related to this computational burden, we decrease the complexity of the equilibrium and therefore
the computation time further by assuming strategic independence between the di⁄erent specialist types.
In his timing game, Einav (2003) demonstrates the development of an equilibrium market structure in
case there is strategic dependence between all types. That is, in a (T + 1)-game where the order of play
is clearly determined, all but the last mover anticipate on the behavior of some types and all but the
￿rst mover condition their expectations on other ￿rms￿ choices. Finally, as indicated by Einav (2003)
the equilibrium calculus is linear in the number of players in the market, and thus has the bene￿t over
simultaneous incomplete information games, which rely on numerical search algorithms.
In sum, the modeling assumptions made are speci￿cally required by the nature of the research question at
hand.27 First, the speci￿cation of the empirical model is invariant to the nature of the strategic interaction
e⁄ects and thus makes no related assumptions on the underlying payo⁄ function. Second, it allows for
asymmetric strategic interaction e⁄ects in GP-specialist interactions, as it avoids related issues of non-
existence of equilibria. Furthermore, we can model and estimate the entry decisions of multiple types of
￿rms simultaneously while retaining point identi￿cation.
4 Empirical Implementation
To use the empirical entry model to explain the characteristics of the Belgian primary and secondary care
markets, it remains to specify the reduced form payo⁄ functions for the physician types and to make an
assumption on the distribution of ￿rm level unobservables. We start the empirical implementation section
by introducing the data on the Belgian health care markets after which we discuss further implementation
and identi￿cation issues.
4.1 Data on Belgian health care markets
In this section, we present the dataset for the study on Belgian GPs and specialists. The ￿rst step in the ap-
plication of the entry model to Belgian physician markets consists of de￿ning the relevant geographic market.
this methodology however does allow for a ￿exible estimation of the strategic interactions and correlation in the unobservables.
27A recent working paper by Vitorino (2007) addresses a related issue using a simultaneous game of incomplete information.
She studies the presence of agglomeration e⁄ects of shopping centers and also uses the property of the incomplete information
game of allowing for the e⁄ect of same type stores to be either positive (agglomeration dominates) or negative.(competition
dominates). The setting is quite di⁄erent though. She considers a limited number of potential entrants (3) with ￿rm-speci￿c
characteristics of a limited number of potential types (3) to choose to enter a shopping mall. Note that there is a di⁄erent
interpretation of the concept of ￿ same-type e⁄ects￿as in the current paper (Vitorino￿ s types are comparable to our classes of
specialists). Instead of assuming sequential entry, it is assumed that the same equilibrium is picked in similar markets. As a
result, her estimation approach is more complex to solve for the equilibrium.
20There is however little guidance on this: unlike in the US, antitrust has not addressed any cases of merging
physician o¢ ces, because this phenomenon is marginal in Belgium and prices are ￿xed. We nonetheless
know that physicians cannot engage in advertising or other promotional selling activities. Therefore, patient
choice is largely guided by local information. Furthermore, 95% of the Belgian population indicates having
a regular GP which is conveniently located close to their home. The town might thus be as far as the sphere
of in￿ uence for a GP reaches. For specialists on the other hand, it is generally believed that patients are
willing to travel further, making the relevant geographic market of specialists larger (Ettinger 1998).
Belgium is made up of towns that are grouped into 586 municipalities, where the average municipality
counts 17;590 inhabitants. In this paper, we de￿ne the municipality as relevant geographic market for all
physician types.28 Allowing for di⁄erences in relevant market de￿nition is subject of future research. For
the empirical implementation of the model, we drop the big cities (> 100;000 inhabitants) from the dataset
and concentrate on markets with at least one physician (of any type) active. This reduces the dataset to 576
Belgian municipalities.
Health providers
Privacy concerns limit the data availability on health care professionals to a location measure (= zip code).
For general practitioners, we rely on a dataset of the Belgian Institute for Sickness and Invalidity Insurance
(RIZIV/INAMI). From this dataset, we deduce the number of GPs that are truly active and available to the
public (outside of hospitals). The selection of active and available GPs is based on their performance. As
selection criterion we use a recent regulation (July 1st, 2006) which states that GPs will only remain certi￿ed
if they have more than 500 visits in one of the last ￿ve years. From dialogue with RIZIV/INAMI, we add
the restriction that GPs should have at least 50 patients in one of the last ￿ve years.29 We used data on
the number of visits of all registered GPs from 2000 until 2004 to deduce the number of active GPs in the
beginning of 2005. This procedure results in the identi￿cation of 11;842 GPs. These GPs have on average
3;794:27 contacts per year (s.d. 3;464) and each serves on average 591:55 patients (s.d. 408).30
For specialists, a dataset from Dendrite Belgium gives the number of active specialists in Belgian zip
codes according to their self-reported ￿eld of specialization in April 2005.31 We opt to work with every
28The relevant geographic market of a GP can be smaller than this, whereas the relevant geographic market of some specialist
types can be larger. Working on an intermediate level (municipality) seems to be a good compromise. This de￿nition is also in
line with the empirical work on physicians in for example Baumgardner (1988) that works on US county level and Newhouse
(1990) that uses the US towns as market de￿nition.
29The basic selection rule corrects for non-specialists uniquely associated to a company and retired GPs that still treat their
own family. As they are not open to the public, their impact on other GPs or specialists can be assumed away. The limitation
with respect to the number of patients aims to ￿lter out those GPs that only perform guard duty. They are excluded as they
do not work within the same time frame as the genuine GPs, so that they cannot be considered genuine competitors.
30An o¢ cial report of RIZIV/INAMI (03/07) indicates the presence of 11;799 active GPs in 2005. We do not have the
appropriate data to simulate their criteria exactly, although we are pretty close.
31There can be some di⁄erence between the o¢ cial ￿eld of specialization, by their RIZIV-number or by the hospital they
might work for, and the self-reported ￿eld of expertise. We choose to work with the self-reported ￿elds as they probably capture
21location where a specialist is active. That is, we are not able to distinguish between the locations in terms of
the time a specialist spends at certain o¢ ces. However, even if the specialist is only active in a local market
for a small time period, he/she will still be available to patients and can thus be considered to interact with
other health care providers.32 We furthermore aggregate specialties as to come to a manageable and more
or less homogenous group of specialist types and de￿ne three classes of specialists. First, there are those
who are claiming a role in the ￿rst line care (WIV 2006). In this class, we identify dermatologists (der),
gynecologists (gyn), pediatricians (ped) and ophthalmologists (opht). The second class of specialists are in
principle concerned with second or third line care, but often have a private o¢ ce outside the hospital. This
class consists of psychiatrists (psych), throat, nose and ear-specialists (TNE) and physiotherapists (phys).33
A third class of medical specialists is especially active in hospitals. Whereas internists (int) and surgeons
(sur) are also available for private consultations, there is no direct access to the remainder of the specialists.
We consider them as one group which we name the ￿ hospital specialists￿(hos). Our focus lies on the ￿rst
and second class of specialists.
A count of the Belgian physicians according to their type in the sampled municipalities is presented in
the ￿rst column of Table 1. We identify for example 776 dermatologist and 1;431 gynecologist o¢ ces in
Belgium. The average number of physicians per type on municipality level is given in the second column
of the table. There are on average 17 GPs active in the selected municipalities, with a large variance: the
dataset consists of both markets with only 1 GP and with more than 100 active GPs. The average number
of specialists lies a lot lower at between 1 and 3 specialists of each type per market. Many municipalities lack
speci￿c specialists: on average 57% of all municipalities does not hold a specialist type. This is especially
the case for markets that do not have a hospital: for these 74% of the markets, there are on average only
0:7 specialists of a speci￿c type active. Note though that only 19% of all municipalities have no specialist
of any type. It is also clear from the data that there is a strong positive correlation between the numbers of
physicians of each type in a market. For example, the number of GPs has the highest correlation with the
number of dermatologists, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0:85 and the correlation between specialist types
averages around 86%.
the specialists￿activities best. Furthermore, we do not use the ￿eld of ￿ general medicine￿ , as it overlaps with the GP dataset.
Note ￿nally, that the RIZIV/INAMI dataset could not be used for specialists, as the home address is reported instead of the
working address.
32An alternative is to work based on the preferred address of the specialist. We believe that this understates the availability
of specialists as well as the e⁄ect its presence has on other physicians in the same markets. We furthermore restrict the sample
of specialists to those who have ￿nished their degree completely. In other words, we do not take up assistants, which however
do treat people. As they are always connected to a specialist, we regard the entire work sta⁄ of the specialist as one. The
presence of assistants however helps to justify the use of all the working addresses of specialists.
33Note that some of the specialist groups we use, are a groups of di⁄erent specialists. For example, physiotherapists comprise
both the specialists in sports health and in physiotherapy.
22Market characteristics
To control for demand and cost characteristics in the di⁄erent municipalities and for di⁄erences in the value
of the outside option, we add a dataset with market characteristics for which the descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 2. According to studies on health status and morbidity, the age, gender and ethnicity
composition together with the socio-economic status of the service population are important indicators for
the demand of GP care (Boerma, 2003). We have information from the National Institute of Statistics
(NIS) on the number of inhabitants (pop, in thousands) and the population density (dens). The dataset
moreover includes variables indicating the age composition of the local population. We opt to work with
seven age groups; ￿ age0_4￿gives the percentage population under the age of 5, ￿ age5_14￿ , ￿ age15_29￿ ,
￿ age30_44￿ , ￿ age45_59￿and ￿ age60_75￿give the percentage population in the respective age groups and
￿nally ￿ age75+￿gives the percentage elderly, de￿ned as over the age of 75. Further market characteristics are
the percentage female population (female), the mean income level measured in ten thousand euros (income),
the unemployment rate (unempl) and the percentage of foreign population (foreign).
We also add other sources of health supply that can have an e⁄ect on the pro￿tability of physicians. We
control for the number of hospital beds in the municipality (beds_hosp) and the number of beds in retirement
homes (beds_rest). Finally, we have dummy variables indicating in which of the 11 provinces/regions of
Belgium the market is located, to identify common pro￿tability shocks (or value of the outside option)
across municipalities in the same area. Note already that our conclusions on the strategic interaction e⁄ects
between physician types are robust against di⁄erent grouping of age categories and against the use of region
dummies and alternative measures related to hospitals.
4.2 Model implementation and Identi￿cation
We use the payo⁄ speci￿cation as introduced in equation (1) in which both the market characteristics and
the number of ￿rms enter linearly (for computational reasons). Note that this implies that we assume that
an extra entrant always has the same impact on payo⁄s, irrespective of the number of entrants that is
already present in the market.34 We allow for asymmetries both in magnitude and in sign, in the strategic
interaction e⁄ects by estimating type-speci￿c coe¢ cients. Standard t-tests su¢ ce to infer the nature of
strategic interactions between Belgian physicians of di⁄erent types. The market characteristics control
for the demand of medical care and for the inherent pro￿tability of the local market: we use the market
characteristics discussed above in the analysis (section 4.1). Note that we use the age category 5 ￿ 14 and
34Theoretically, one can estimate a more realistic pattern of e⁄ects, with e.g. ￿xed e⁄ects for all market structures. However,
our dataset restricts the extent to which we can identify such parameters: we have few markets with a low number of GP
entrants and a lot of markets with no specialist entrants. Our assumption furthermore contains the number of parameters to
estimate.
23the region of Brussels as the baseline and that we have no exclusion restrictions: all market characteristics
can a⁄ect the payo⁄s of all physician types.
We treat the model unobservables ("m
f;t) as realizations of a standard logistic distribution. Using this
distributional assumption of the private information component of payo⁄s, we can specify the probabilities
of observing nm
t physicians of type t, de￿ned in equations (3) and (6), as ordered logit expressions:35
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These probabilities are used directly to form the likelihood function as speci￿ed in equation (7). Remark that
GPs decide based on expected payo⁄s, where they anticipate the choice behavior of the di⁄erent specialist
types. Calculating these expected payo⁄s therefore implies computing the probability of observing any
number of specialists of any type conditional on any possible number of GP entrants (equation 5).36 For
estimation, we reduce the dimensionality of the problem by limiting the number of physicians of each type
to a maximum of 30 (8t : Ft = 30). With 87:5% of our markets containing less than 30 GPs and virtually
all municipalities having less than 30 specialists of a speci￿c type, this assumption is not restrictive.
Estimation of the model identi￿es the coe¢ cients related to the market characteristics (￿t) and the
coe¢ cients related to the number of ￿rms of own type and of the other types (￿t;￿tj). All these coe¢ cients
are identi￿ed up to the scale of the error term. Furthermore, the e⁄ects of the other-type ￿rms are not
separately identi￿ed from possible correlation in the unobservables. The current framework does not allow
for correlation in the realizations of the error terms.37 Consequently, the ￿nding of a positive (negative)
interaction e⁄ect can be due to real complementarities (substitutability) between the professionals, but can
also originate from a positive (negative) correlation in the market unobservables.38 We follow two approaches
to limit the related concerns: ￿rst, we correct for a lot of market characteristics, as to reduce the magnitude
35We can also estimate the model under the assumption that the unobservables are distributed according to a standard
normal. This yields ordered probit expressions and our conclusions are robust against the distributional assumption.
36Note that the computational bene￿t of assuming GPs to move ￿rst lies here. In case the di⁄erent specialist types were to
decide ￿rst, each of them would have to anticipate on the choice behavior of the GPs, which condition on the entry decisions
of all specialist types. As a result, one specialist type now has to take into account the choice behavior of all other specialist
types.
37Note that models of complete information in general do not alleviate this problem: whereas they do allow for correlation
in strategic interaction e⁄ects, separate identi￿cation of the correlation coe¢ cient from these e⁄ects is not straightforward and
requires good instrumentation in the payo⁄s of all types (Athey & Stern, 2003).
38Also note that the assumption implies no correlation between the unobservables of the same ￿rm in two markets and no
correlation between the unobservables of two same type ￿rms in the same markets. Complete information models on the other
hand assume there to be perfect correlation within type - the error term realization is market and type speci￿c but not ￿rm
speci￿c. The reality probably lies in between.
24of the unobservables and second, we estimate the model while allowing for a high degree of ￿rm heterogeneity
in the market, which reduces the possible bias on the individual interaction e⁄ects in the GP payo⁄function.
Ideally, we would estimate a speci￿cation with a payo⁄ function for all physician types separately. How-
ever, despite the reduction of computational burden due to the assumption of strategic independence between
specialist types, we are still confronted with optimization problems (we have no exclusion restrictions). We
therefore use the classes of specialists to reduce the number of ￿rm types in the empirical model (see section
4.1). With our primary interest in the e⁄ect on GP payo⁄s of specialists of classes 1 and 2, we estimate
the model twice. In the ￿rst estimation, we focus on the strategic interaction of the entry decisions of GPs
and specialist types of class 1, while grouping the other specialist types by class. That is, we specify pay-
o⁄s for seven physician types: GPs, dermatologists, gynecologists, pediatricians, ophthalmologists, class-2
specialists and class-3 specialists. The second estimation does the same but then considers the specialist
types of class 2. Payo⁄s are de￿ned for six types: GPs, psychiatrists, TNE-specialists, physiologists, class-1
specialists and class-3 specialists. Note that the entry behavior of class-3 specialists is always included as an
endogenous control variable in the identi￿cation of the strategic interaction e⁄ects of the other specialists.39
Our conclusions seem to be robust against alternative groupings of specialist types.
5 Estimation Results and discussion
Tables 3 and 5 present the results of the estimation of the empirical entry model in which we focus on the
￿rst class of specialists, for the strategic interaction e⁄ects and the market characteristics respectively. The
estimated coe¢ cients for the speci￿cation with class-2 specialists are given in Tables 4 and 6. The di⁄erent
columns of the tables give the estimated coe¢ cients for the di⁄erent physician types of the simultaneous
estimation.
As a goodness-of-￿t measure, we simulate the number of entrants of all types given the market charac-
teristics. That is, for 1;000 random draws for the error terms (from a logistic distribution), we calculate
the equilibrium number of entrants in each market. We are able to predict the number of entrants rather
accurate: the observed number of entrants of all types always lies within the con￿dence bounds of the mean
of our simulated number of entrants per market. Following Berry and Waldfogel (1999), we compute the
correlation of the predicted and the actual number of entrants per type to construct a R2 for the regression.
For the estimation with the class-1 (class-2) specialist types, we get an average R2 of 0:82 (0:84).40
39Remark that we make the simplifying assumption that all specialist types of the same class are homogeneous. This implies
that the entry of e.g. an internist has the same impact on internists￿payo⁄s as the entry of a surgeon does. As we are not
primarily interested in this group, we allow for this stringent assumption to lighten further computational burden.
40Note that the estimation with the focus on the class-2 specialists yields a very high predictive power for GPs with a type-
25First, consider the estimated coe¢ cients for the strategic interaction e⁄ects in Tables 3 and 4. The
estimation results indicate that the e⁄ect of the number of ￿rms of the own type is always negative. The
higher the number of same-type rivals, the lower payo⁄s of entering the market. This is both consistent
with economic theory and required by the equilibrium model we put forward. For the e⁄ect of the number
of ￿rms of the other types, the results are mixed. First, the number of GPs in the market positively a⁄ects
payo⁄s of all specialist types (insigni￿cant for physiologists). This can be explained by the lower workload
of referred visits compared to self-referrals. That is, when a patient is referred by a GP, basic tests have
been performed and the specialist can directly target the established health issues. A self-referral in contrast
requires the specialist to spend more time and to perform more tests before he can pin down the real issue.
The strategic interaction e⁄ects in the GP payo⁄ function on the other hand have varying signs. GP
payo⁄s are positively a⁄ected by the number of gynecologists, ophthalmologists and TNE-specialists in the
market. In other words, the bene￿ts for GPs from the ability to refer outweigh the costs associated with the
free access to these specialist types. Patients that require the care of these specialists thus mainly access sec-
ondary care through the GP (high referral e⁄ect) or correctly self-refer (low competition e⁄ect). The number
of dermatologists and pediatricians however has a negative impact on GP probability of entry. The costs
due to the competition for patients here outweigh the referral bene￿ts. A high proportion of the patients
that use these types of secondary care services thus visit specialists without a referral while not necessarily
requiring it (high competition e⁄ect). Finally, we ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect of the presence of psychiatrists
and physiologists on GP payo⁄s. For Belgium, we can thus conclude that the use of gynecologists￿ , ophthal-
mologists￿and TNE-specialists￿services can be considered as complementary to GP services, whereas the
use of dermatologists￿and pediatricians￿services are mainly substitutes to GP services.
The results from the Belgian health survey (WIV 2006) can help explain this grouping. This survey
indicates pediatricians and dermatologists as the two specialist types that generate the lowest percentage of
follow-up contacts (62% and 56% respectively). Therefore, a large part of their income depends on the new
visits for which they can compete with GPs. The survey also identi￿es these specialist types as attracting
the highest percentage of patients that self-refer (73% and 68%). For gynecologists and ophthalmologist on
the other hand, the survey indicates that the percentage of follow-up contacts is high (82% and 73%), which
implies fewer incentives to compete directly with GPs.
To illustrate the meaning of the magnitudes of the estimated strategic interaction e⁄ects, we simulate the
predicted change in the number of GP entrants due to changes in the number of a specialist type under the
current behavior of patients, GPs and specialists (not shown). The results of such simulation are especially
speci￿c R2 of 0:93. The estimation with the class-1 specialists does worse in predicting the number of GP entrants (R2=0:67),
but the predictive power for the specialist types remains accurate.
26relevant in the direction of the change that they indicate and no so much in the magnitude of this change.41
For 1;000 random draws for the error terms (from a logistic distribution), we calculate the equilibrium
number of GP entrants in each market given 0, 1, 2 or 3 specialists of a type, holding market characteristics
and the observed number of entrants of other types constant.42 For dermatologists (pediatricians), we ￿nd
that the equilibrium number of GP entrants decreases in the presence of more of these specialists. More
speci￿cally, the average market sustains 15:85 (15:15) GPs in the absence of dermatologists (pediatricians),
while this decreases to an average of 8:24 (9:46) GPs when there is 1 of these specialists present in all markets
and to 4:80 (6:06) GPs when every market holds 3 dermatologists (pediatricians). For e.g. gynecologists
(TNE-specialists) the predictions go in the opposite direction as GPs bene￿t from the presence of these
specialist types. Whereas the average market sustains 5:14 (10:28) GPs in the absence of gynecologists
(TNE-specialists), the average number of GPs increases (non signi￿cantly) to 18:73 (14:68) when there is 1
of these specialists present in all markets and to 24:31 (23:12) GPs when every market holds 3 gynecologists
(TNE-specialists).
The ￿ndings on the nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects have further relevance for policy makers.
When a mandatory referral scheme would be introduced in Belgium (or in case the price di⁄erence between
referrals and self-referrals for specialist visits are su¢ cient to induce a comparable change in behavior by
patients), the market opportunities of all health professionals change. The main e⁄ect of this is to be expected
for dermatologists and pediatricians. That is, these specialist types now realize a substantial part of their
business (income) from unnecessary self-referrals. Since this patient ￿ ow gets diverted to GPs upon the
introduction of gatekeeping, substantial drops in patientele are likely. Since patients that use gynecologist,
ophthalmologist and TNE-care mainly get referred to specialists or correctly self-refer, the main source of
pro￿tability is expected to remain intact for these health professionals.
An important remark is in place. In the analysis, we estimate the net e⁄ect of the presence of specialist
types on GP payo⁄s. Therefore, the ￿nding of a positive e⁄ect only implies that the referral e⁄ect dominates
the competition e⁄ect. It can thus be the case that the competition e⁄ect is very big, but that the referral
e⁄ect is slightly more important. In this case of course, a substantial impact of the introduction of gatekeeping
is to be expected as well. That is, still a large proportion of the patientele (and the income) of the specialist
41We assume in the estimation that the e⁄ects of the number of ￿rms of any type is linear. This implies that the e⁄ect of
the ￿rst specialist-entrant has the same impact on GP payo⁄s as the entry of the third entrant of the same type. This might
not be entirely realistic, but reduces the computational burden in the estimation to a signi￿cant extent. Also, we assume the
behavior of all players to be constant over the di⁄erent scenarios: obviously this is a strong assumption. Put di⁄erently, in a
small market with e.g. 1 GP we simulate the impact on his pro￿tability of entry of an entry by various numbers of specialist
entrants, even though this could not realize in reality as the population size does not allow for any specialist to enter.
42Note ￿rst that the status-quo prediction of the average number of GPs in a market is rather accurate for the estimation
of the class-2 specialists: in the presence of the observed number of entrants of all types, the average equals 13:28, with the
observed average, after we reduce the maximum number of entrants per market to 30 for estimation, equals 14:49. The average
number of GP entrants per market under the observed number of specialists in the estimation on the class-1 specialist types
does worse with 7:67, but a large standard deviation.
27type results from wrong self-referrals. Whereas dermatologists and pediatricians are expected to experience
the largest drop in market demand, the other specialist types will also be a⁄ected to some extent by the
introduction of mandatory referral schemes. We thus identify the ￿ lower bound￿of the e⁄ect.
Consider for completeness the estimation results of the e⁄ects of market characteristics on the entry
probabilities of the physician types in Tables 5 and 6. Caution is to be advised in the interpretation of
these results: our controls for market demand, costs and outside option are aggregate and exhibit a strong
colinearity. In general though, we ￿nd that GP payo⁄s of entering a market are positively a⁄ected by
population size. The bigger the potential market, the more pro￿table and thus probable is entry of a GP.
Some less signi￿cant e⁄ects are found for the income level of the population and the presence of hospitals
(only in one of the speci￿cations). The ￿nding of the positive e⁄ect of mean income level is unexpected.
That is, most studies ￿nd a negative impact: a lower income also indicates a lower health status and mostly
a lower use of specialist care. Also the positive impact of the number of hospital beds might be surprising
as emergency rooms of hospitals are often used as an alternative for GP care in the weekend or at night
(although the regulator tries to limit this). Note though that we also control for the number of specialists
in these hospitals, which makes a clean interpretation hard. Other demographic characteristics seem not to
matter for GP payo⁄s, once the presence of specialist types is accounted for.
The e⁄ects of market characteristics show similar patterns for the di⁄erent specialist types. Market size
(population) and the presence and size of hospitals are important indicators for the pro￿tability of any
specialist: the higher the number of inhabitants (except for psychiatrists) and the higher the number of
hospital beds, the higher the probability of observing more specialists of any type. For most types, the
age structure of the population also has an e⁄ect. With the baseline the percentage of kids (5 ￿ 14), the
percentage of toddlers (0 ￿ 4) and the percentage population in the 45 ￿ 59 age category lower the payo⁄s
of entry of (gynecologists), pediatricians and ophtamologists. On the other hand, entry payo⁄s of most
specialist types are positively a⁄ected by the percentage population in the 15 ￿ 29 age group. The results
seem not to be very intuitive in all cases, but should be taken into context. Consider e.g. pediatrician payo⁄s
is negatively a⁄ected by the percentage toddlers. The estimation controls for a lot of other characteristics
of the market. Therefore, this coe¢ cient has the interpretation of the residual e⁄ect of the percentage
toddlers, conditioned on e.g. the percentage of females in the market and conditional on the percentage of
young adults. As expected, the percentage females and the mean income level positively a⁄ect the payo⁄s
of especially the class-1 specialists. The unemployment rate of the population negatively a⁄ects especially
pediatricians. Finally, the province/region dummies are all estimated negatively, which can indicate a low
value of the outside option for health professionals in the Brussels region. These dummies are however not
28signi￿cant for the GP and for class-3 specialists.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the nature of the strategic interactions between general practitioners and specialists
of di⁄erent types. More precisely, we study whether GPs bene￿t from the presence of a specialist due to the
option of referral, or that rather the competition e⁄ect a GP experiences from specialists dominates their
interaction. The entry literature lends itself nicely for studying health care markets, as data availability is
often an issue. We put forward a sequential incomplete information entry game that has the ￿ exibility to
identify the sign of the strategic interaction e⁄ects between di⁄erent types of ￿rms. The model is designed
to avoid restrictions on the underlying payo⁄ functions with respect to the e⁄ect of other-type ￿rms and
to avoid issues of non-existence of equilibria in case the strategic interaction e⁄ects are asymmetric in sign.
At the same time, the model remains computationally tractable and allows for su¢ cient ￿rm heterogeneity.
We use this game to study the strategic interactions in the Belgian physician markets, in which there is no
gatekeeping role for GPs.
Whereas the entry literature has traditionally focused on questions of product di⁄erentiation, this paper
demonstrates the use of entry models to tackle a di⁄erent type of research question. That is, we study the
precise nature of the strategic interactions between di⁄erent types of ￿rms. Although the entry literature has
boomed in the last ￿ve years, not much attention has been given to this problem. Because of the tradition
of studying problems of product di⁄erentiation, the assumption of types being strategic substitutes in the
entry decision is ubiquitous. Often the strategic interactions between types of ￿rms are however not this
simple: even though the competition e⁄ect is most obvious, at least some positive e⁄ect from the presence of
other-type ￿rms are likely (think of e.g. agglomeration e⁄ects, Vitorino 2007). When modeling the strategic
interactions between types of ￿rms, it is therefore advisable to allow for the possibility that this positive
e⁄ect is present and possibly dominates the negative e⁄ect. To model and estimate ￿rm conduct while
allowing for these more ￿ exible interactions between ￿rm types requires the researcher to abandon either the
pure strategy equilibrium assumption or the assumption of complete information, with the latter strategy
demonstrated in this paper.
For the Belgian physician markets, the results indicate that we can group specialists into three categories.
First, the decisions of certain specialist types are strategic complements to the entry decision of GPs. This
category includes gynecologists, ophthalmologists and throat, nose and ear-specialists (TNE). As GP payo⁄s
29are increasing in the number of specialists of these types, we ￿nd that the competition e⁄ect (patients go to
the specialist instead of to the GP) is dominated by the referral e⁄ect (GPs￿cost of treatment drop). Patients
are especially referred to these specialist types or correctly self-refer to them. A second group of specialists
consists of dermatologists and pediatricians, whose entry decisions are found to be strategic substitutes in
the entry decision of GPs. These specialist types especially compete for patients with GPs. Self-referred
visits make up a signi￿cant part of the income of these specialists and often concern health issues that do
not require specialist care. The availability of a third group of specialist services has no signi￿cant impact
on GP payo⁄s. That is, the positive referral e⁄ect balances out against the negative competition e⁄ect for
psychiatrists and physiologists. On the other hand, specialists of all types bene￿t from the presence of GPs
in the market.
As there is no gatekeeping in Belgium, the sign of the strategic interaction e⁄ects of specialist types on
GPs￿entry decisions is furthermore instructive for the likelihood of viability threats upon the introduction
of gatekeeping into the care system. As the mandatory referral scheme excludes the possibility for patients
to self-refer to a specialist, our ￿ndings suggest that mainly dermatologists and pediatricians are likely
to be threatened in their viability with the introduction of gatekeeping. This is especially the case when
gatekeeping is gradually introduced as in the case in Belgium and neighboring countries. That is, in case a
mandatory referral scheme is implemented without the accompanying capitation system, the income level of
specialists is directly a⁄ected. Furthermore, because of this, specialists have incentives to (start to) induce
more demand for their services as to maintain their income level. The anticipated bene￿ts in terms of cost
containment would then not realize. Remark that data from RIZIV/INAMI on the number of contacts
per GP for 2000-2004 indicates that the average workload of GPs has dropped over this time period: the
average GP used to have 4;025:25 contacts per year (s.d. 2;587), whereas this average dropped to 3;794:27
contacts per year in 2004 (s.d. 3;464). The drop in the average contacts per year goes hand in hand with a
drop in the average GP income level. We therefore expect that in a ￿rst reaction to the introduction of a
mandatory referral scheme, GPs will experience the opportunity to restore their income level (in the current
fee-for-service system). GPs will therefore have no incentives to redirect as many patients as possible to
specialized care, so that the realization of substantial income drops for certain types of specialists is likely,
at least in the medium run.
In case the mandatory referral scheme is combined with a capitation system, comparable problems emerge.
To ensure viability, the ￿xed fee per patient enrolled with a specialist will have to be set high, both in absolute
terms and compared to the capitation for the GP, as the number of patients per specialist will be relatively
low. From a budget perspective, this will not be maintainable. In case the regulator puts a more realistic
30￿xed fee for specialists, a proportion of the health professionals will experience viability problems and the
transition costs will materialize. Note that the only way viability issues would not emerge is when GPs do
not get the correct incentives. That is, in case GPs minimize their e⁄ort level and always refer patients to
specialists, the current body of specialists can be sustained.
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32Tables and Figures
Table 1: Total and average number of physicians per municipality in Belgium, according to physician type
for the sampled markets (nobs=576)
Physician type Total number Average per market
of physicians mean (s.d.)
GP 9;884 17:16 (16:76)
der 776 1:35 (3:24)
gyn 1;431 2:48 (7:06)
ped 1;082 1:88 (4:99)
opht 1;052 1:83 (4:14)
psych 1;924 3:34 (9:12)
TNE 708 1:23 (3:15)
phys 846 1:47 (2:75)
int 3;814 6:62 (19:77)
sur 2;700 4:69 (12:64)
hos 5;936 10:31 (28:48)
Source: own calculations based on RIZIV (2005) and Dendrite (2005).
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of market characteristics (nobs=576)
Variable Mean (s.d.)
pop number of inhabitants (x1;000) 15:01 (13:59)
dens population density (x1;000) 0:50 (0:83)
age0_4 percentage under age of 5 0:06 (0:01)
age5_14 percentage in age category 5 ￿ 14 0:13 (0:01)
age15_29 percentage in age category 15 ￿ 29 0:18 (0:01)
age30_44 percentage in age category 30 ￿ 44 0:23 (0:01)
age45_59 percentage in age category 45 ￿ 59 0:20 (0:01)
age60_75 percentage in age category 60 ￿ 75 0:14 (0:02)
age75+ percentage over age of 75 0:07 (0:01)
female percentage female 0:51 (0:01)
foreign percentage foreigners 0:05 (0:06)
income mean income level (x10;000) 2:51 (0:37)
unempl unemployment rate 0:05 (0:03)
beds_hosp number of hospital beds (x100) 1:55 (4:18)
beds_rest number of beds in retirement homes (x100) 1:85 (2:20)
Ant province dummy for Antwerpen 0:12 (0:33)
Bru region dummy for Brussels 0:03 (0:16)
VlB province dummy for Vlaams-Brabant 0:11 (0:32)
Bwa province dummy for Brabant wallon 0:05 (0:21)
WVl province dummy for West-Vlaanderen 0:11 (0:31)
OVl province dummy for Oost-Vlaanderen 0:11 (0:31)
Hai province dummy for Hainaut 0:12 (0:32)
Lie province dummy for Liege 0:14 (0:35)
Lim province dummy for Limburg 0:07 (0:26)
Lux province dummy for Luxembourg 0:08 (0:27)
Nam province dummy for Namur 0:06 (0:25)
Source: NIS (2001), RIZIV (2005). See text for the de￿nitions of the variables.
33Table 3: Estimation results on the strategic interaction e⁄ects of the empirical model with seven types: GPs,
dermatologists (der), gynecologists (gen), pediatricians (ped), ophthalmologists (opht), class-2 specialists
(class2) and class-3 specialists (class3)*
GP der gyn ped opht class2 class3
N_GP ￿1:252 0:042 0:048 0:068 0:083 0:047 0:055
(0:13) (0:01) (0:01) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:05)
N_der ￿68:185 ￿0:982 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(39:04) (0:06)
N_gyn 57:928 ￿ ￿0:580 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(21:05) (0:03)
N_ped ￿40:435 ￿ ￿ ￿0:759 ￿ ￿ ￿
(21:10) (0:04)
N_opht 31:617 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:904 ￿ ￿
(16:64) (0:06)
N_class2 ￿5:787 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:541 ￿
(1:85) (0:03)
N_class3 ￿0:054 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:265
(0:10) (0:01)
* Each column gives the estimated coe¢ cients of the e⁄ect of the number of physicians of
the di⁄erent types (rows) on the payo⁄s of a physician type. Standard errors are reported
within brackets. Class 2 groups all psychiatrists, TNE-specialists and physiologists together,
while class 3 groups internists, surgeons and hospital specialists. The associated estimated
coe¢ cients for the market controls are presented in Table 5.
34Table 4: Estimation results on the strategic interaction e⁄ects of the empirical model with six types: GPs,
psychiatrists (psych), throat-, nose- and ear specialists (TNE), physiologists (phys), class-1 specialists (class1)
and class-3 specialists (class3)*
GP psych TNE phys class1 class3
N_GP ￿0:933 0:067 0:081 0:039 0:013 0:074
(0:07) (0:03) (0:02) (0:03) (0:04) (0:05)
N_phys ￿0:148 ￿0:575 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(0:65) (0:03)
N_TNE 4:437 ￿ ￿0:841 ￿ ￿ ￿
(1:32) (0:06)
N_phys -0:600 ￿ ￿ ￿0:986 ￿ ￿
(0:90) (0:06)
N_class1 ￿1:056 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:430 ￿
(0:39) (0:03)
N_class3 0:152 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:263
(0:07) (0:02)
* Each column gives the estimated coe¢ cients of the e⁄ect of the number of physicians of the
di⁄erent types (rows) on the payo⁄s of a physician type. Standard errors are reported within
brackets. Class 1 groups all dermatologists, gynecologists, pediatricians and ophthalmologists
together, while class 3 groups internists, surgeons and hospital specialists. The associated





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Figure 1: Empirical entry game under complete information and simultaneous decision making (2 ￿rms).
Panel A represents the mapping in case payo⁄s of both ￿rms are decreasing in the presence of the other ￿rm (strategic
substitutes), panel B assumes strategic complementarity in the entry decisions for both ￿rms and panel C represents
the case with asymmetric strategic interaction e⁄ects (in sign): the decision of ￿rm 2 is a strategic substitute for the
decision of ￿rm 1, while ￿rm 1￿ s decision is a strategic complement to the decision of ￿rm 2.
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38Figure 2: Empirical entry game under incomplete information and simultaneous decision making (2 ￿rms)
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Figure 3: Empirical entry game under incomplete information and sequential decision making (￿rm 1 decides
￿rst).
Panel A represents the mapping when the entry decision of ￿rm 1 is a strategic substitute in the entry decision of ￿rm
2, whereas panel B assumes payo⁄s of entry for ￿rm 2 are increasing in the presence of ￿rm 1 (strategic complement).
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